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The merit-vs-diversity balance in university-admissions remains a controversial issue. Statis-
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Cambridge admission-process, we compare post-entry exam-scores of directly admitted h-type
students with g-types entering via the “pool” — a second-round clearing-mechanism. Better
performance by the latter implies higher admission-standards for g-types, irrespective of the
unobservability problem. We find strong evidence of higher admission-standards for males in
STEM/Economics, and a weak one for private-school applicants. The gender-gap weakens over
time for a cohort, and is non-evident in Law/Medicine.
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Top universities around the world are routinely criticized for encouraging social elitism in their
undergraduate admissions, and not contributing adequately to inter-generational mobility. On
the other hand, the universities’ own attempts at promoting diversity are viewed by others as
undermining academic merit for catering to populist political demand. Another common criticism
is that under-prepared students admitted via affi rmative action cannot cope with the workload,
which hurts their ultimate career-prospects (Sander 2004, Arcidiacono et al 2016). These issues
are frequently covered by the news media, discussed by politicians, and have even resulted in high-
profile lawsuits. In the United Kingdom, much of this debate concerns undergraduate admissions
to Oxford and Cambridge, collectively called ‘Oxbridge’. Unlike the top US colleges, they are
primarily state-funded, and are often criticized for the high share of students from independent, i.e.
fee-charging, private schools which typically cater to relatively wealthier households, as opposed to
publicly funded state schools that are free to attend. For example, a highly cited 2018 Sutton Trust
report revealed that between 2015-17, Oxford and Cambridge “recruit(ed) more students from eight
top schools than almost 3,000 other UK state schools put together” (BBC 7 Dec, 2018) —six of
these eight being expensive, independent schools. On the other hand, the fraction of offers made to
female applicants has been steadily rising in both universities, and has been close to or higher than
50% in recent years.1 In their admission statements, both universities claim to be looking solely for
academic promise irrespective of social background.2 Given this context, an interesting question is
whether and to what extent do the aggregate admission statistics result from merit-based entry.
In this paper, we formally investigate the extent of meritocracy in Cambridge admissions by
asking whether all applicants are held to the same bar of academic promise as measured by ex-
pected future exam performance, with social/demographic background playing a role only insofar
as they predict academic merit. To answer this question, we use recent applicant-level administra-
tive micro-data from Cambridge, matched with post-admission performance of admitted students
from different socio-demographic groups in Cambridge’s blindly marked, internal exams. Had the
admission-bar been higher for one group, the marginal —but not necessarily the average —entrants






idea, going back to Becker 1957, has been used by researchers to test for fair decision-making in
various applied settings including college admissions, e.g. Bertrand et al 2010. However, detecting
the marginal applicant is impossible when admissions are based on many separate indicators of
academic merit, some of which are used by admission offi cers but unobserved by researchers (e.g.
the quality of confidential reference letters), leading to the so-called “infra-marginality”problem.
Furthermore, the common practice of predicting future academic performance for applicants by
regressing the outcomes of admitted students on their pre-entry characteristics and test-scores suf-
fers from classic sample selection bias, typically biasing estimated coeffi cients towards zero. These
problems apply to many other settings where discrimination is a concern, such as law-enforcement
and legal sentencing, c.f. Arnold et al 2018.
In the present paper, our strategy to get around the infra-marginality problem is to use the
two-staged nature of Cambridge’s admission process, explained below in details. The key feature
of this process that is of interest to us is that a subgroup of applicants enter Cambridge through
the ‘pool’. Students placed in the pool are those perceived to be less meritorious than the first-
round direct admits, but worth keeping in contention. The data can identify this subgroup. The
applicants perceived to be the best among the pooled may eventually be admitted, depending
on how many spots are available after the first round of admissions. Therefore, comparing the
post-entry exam performance of pooled admits of social group g with that of the direct admits of
group h can reveal whether the criteria used to rank applicants in the first round are statistically
consistent with a meritocratic goal. In particular, if the former perform systematically better in
post-admission exams, then that suggests that g-types face a higher bar of academic merit for
direct admissions than h-types, whether or not the analyst observes all of the relevant applicant
characteristics observed by the admission offi cers.
Short Literature Review: Holzer and Neumark 2000 provide a broad economic perspective
on affi rmative action policies in various real-life settings; Arcidiacono et al 2015 summarize the
existing empirical literature on affi rmative action in (mostly US) college admissions with a focus
on applicant-race. Bhattacharya et al 2017 analyzed the question of meritocratic admissions using
a small dataset for a single subject at a different UK university; their approach was not outcome-
based, and addressed the infra-marginality problem using the assumption that observables and
unobservables were positively associated. Educational sociologists in the UK have documented
lower application success rates at the most selective (Russell Group) universities for ethnic minority
and state-school students with similar observable qualifications as their ethnically white and private
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school counterparts, c.f. Boliver 2013 and Zimdars et al 2009. These latter studies are somewhat
descriptive, and do not consider the role of unobservables, nor any post-admission outcomes. In
contrast to them, the present paper uses an outcome-based test (viz. post-entry exam performance)
in the tradition of Becker 1957, and an institutional detail — as opposed to an assumption — to
overcome the infra-marginality problem caused by unobservables. In addition, we document some
interesting empirical contrasts between STEM versus competitive non-STEM subjects, and the
progression of performance-gaps through the years for a cohort which, to our knowledge, are novel
in the literature, and throw new light on the question of meritocracy in university admissions.
2 Cambridge Admissions
In the UK, high-school leavers at age 18+ apply to university to study a specific subject such
as Mathematics, History, Law etc. Cambridge and Oxford are among the most prestigious and
selective among UK universities, and a student can apply to one but not both in the same year.
At Cambridge (similar to Oxford), a student applies through one of the constituent colleges which
conducts assessment for that applicant. Each college has an intended range for the number of places
for each subject in which it admits, e.g. 10-12 spots for Mathematics, 7-8 spots for Economics
etc. The exact assessment procedure varies by subject, but the general procedure consists of the
following steps. Applications are initially assessed on the basis of past indicators of academic ability,
including an initial entrance exam in some but not all subjects. The most promising ones are then
invited to a further in-house assessment —usually consisting of an academic interview and, in some
subjects, a written test —and the rest are rejected. Applicants who appear strongest on the basis
of all available information, including the in-house assessments and school-leaving board exams e.g.
International Baccalaureate (IB) or GCSE/A-levels, are admitted directly by the college they had
applied to.3 A subset of the remaining students who are deemed relatively strong by the application
college are placed in a common, university-wide ‘pool’. If a college has not filled all its places after
the first round, then it can admit one or more students from the common pool in the second round.
During each academic year following admissions, all admitted students attend common, university-
wide lectures for each paper (i.e. ‘course’in US terminology) that constitutes their subject, and
small-group teaching sessions called ‘supervisions’, some of which are taught by academics affi liated
3Typically, A-level and IB results are not published by the time of assessments. In these cases, the offers are
conditional upon reaching a certain minimum standard in those exams.
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with their own college and some by those in other colleges. All students sit a common, end-of-year
exam called the ‘Tripos’in these papers at the end of each year of their study. These exams are
assessed centrally at the university-level, and marked blindly. We use the percentage of marks
obtained at the first year Tripos, standardized by subject, as our primary ‘outcome’of interest. We
then use performance in later years to examine the longer term validity of our main conclusions.4
2.1 Econometric Model and Identification Strategy
Let the two groups under consideration be denoted by g and h, e.g. g can be males and h females,
or h can be state-school educated and g privately educated, etc. Denote by Ag the academic ability
of a g-type applicant, as inferred by admission offi cers. The admission decision can be summarized
via three thresholds g2 < g3 < g1 such that if Ag > g1, then the applicant is admitted directly; if
Ag < g2 then s/he is rejected straight away; and if g2 < Ag < g1, then the candidate is put in the
pool. Finally, if g3 < Ag < g1, then the candidate is admitted from the pool, provided there are
unfilled spots after direct admissions in the first round. For h-type applicants, denote the analogous
quantities by Ah and h1, h2, h3 respectively.
Following admissions, the annual exam performance (Tripos score) is then generated by Yg =
Ag + εg for g-type and Yh = Ah + εh for h-type respectively, where εg and εh are stochastic noise
terms that affect exam scores over and above Ag and Ah. We will assume that admission offi cers’
inference is correct on average, i.e. E (εg|Ag) = 0 and E (εh|Ah) = 0. This may be justified as
follows. Suppose the admission offi cers observe the set of characteristics Xg (some components
of which may be unobservable to the researcher) for each group g, and from this infer the ability
Ag = E (Yg|Xg). Then εg = Yg − E (Yg|Xg), implying by definition that E (εg|Xg) = 0, and
therefore E (εg|Ag) = 0, since Ag is solely a function of Xg. In particular, this implies that with
FAg (·) denoting the marginal distribution of Ag, any set C with FAg (·)-positive probability, we
have that:
E (εg|Ag ∈ C) =
∫
a∈C
E (εg|Ag = a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
dFAg (a) da = 0. (1)
This implication will be used below.
Detecting Sign of Threshold Differences: The econometrician observes the distributions
4Our analysis of meritocracy is thus at the aggregate university level, combining all colleges together; in our
empirical work, we will investigate the robustness of our findings to the inclusion of college-fixed effects, where
relevant.
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of Tripos scores of all entrants and, in particular, those of g-type admits entering via the pool:
Yg = Ag + εg|g3 < Ag < g1, and of Non-Pooled (i.e. directly admitted) h-type admits: Yh =
Ah + εh|Ah ≥ h1. Therefore, the observable average Tripos score of Pooled g-type admits satisfies
E[Yg|g3 < Ag < g1] ≡ E [Ag + εg|g3 < Ag < g1]
= E [Ag|g3 < Ag < g1] + E [εg|g3 < Ag < g1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by (1)
= E [Ag|g3 < Ag < g1] < g1, (2)
while the observable average Tripos Score of Non-Pooled h-type admits satisfies
E [Yh|Ah ≥ h1] ≡ E [Ah + εh|Ah ≥ h1]
= E [Ah|Ah ≥ h1] + E [εh|Ah ≥ h1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by (1)
= E [Ah|Ah ≥ h1] ≥ h1. (3)
It follows from (2) and (3) that
g1 − h1 > E [Ag + εg|g3 < Ag < g1]− E [Ah + εh|Ah ≥ h1] . (4)
The RHS of (4) therefore provides a lower bound on the difference in thresholds g1 − h1. In
particular, if the average Tripos score for pooled g-type admits is (weakly) higher than that of
non-pooled h-type admits, i.e.
E [Ag + εg|g3 < Ag < g1] ≥ E [Ah + εh|Ah ≥ h1] , (5)
then g1 > h1. In particular, if Pr (g3 < Ag < g1) > 0, and Pr (Ah > h1) > 0 —corresponding to
the likely scenario that perceived ability is continuously distributed —then even equality of mean
Tripos scores, i.e. E [Ag + εg|g3 < Ag < g1] = E [Ah + εh|Ah ≥ h1] will also imply g1 > h1.
In interpreting the above inequalities, we do not and cannot distinguish between the possibili-
ties that any observed deviations from meritocratic admissions arises either (i) because admission
offi cers have systematically biased beliefs against g-types but use the same bar of expected perfor-
mance for everyone, or (ii) because they have correct beliefs on average but use a systematically
higher threshold for g-types as part of an affi rmative action plan. Note also that reversal of in-
equality (5) i.e. E [Ag + εg|g3 < Ag < g1] < E [Ah + εh|Ah ≥ h1] is consistent with both g1 > h1
and g1 < h1, and is therefore inconclusive.
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Risk and Stochastic Dominance: Suppose admission-offi cers are risk averse and base the
admission-decision on Bg ≡ E (U (Yg) |Xg) for a concave, increasing U (·), and with Bg > g1
implying direct admission etc. as above. Define εg = U (Yg)−Bg, εh = U (Yh)−Bh and note that
E [εg|g3 < Bg < g1] = 0 = E [U (Yh) |Bh ≥ h1] by the same logic as above. Now, if the distribution
of Yg|g3 < Bg < g1 first order stochastic dominates (FOSD) that of Yh|Bh ≥ h1 (as found in the
empirics reported below), then E [U (Yg) |g3 < Bg < g1] ≥ E [U (Yh) |Bh ≥ h1] for all increasing
U (·), and therefore,
g1 − h1 > E [U (Yg) |g3 < Bg < g1]− E [U (Yh) |Bh ≥ h1] ≥ 0. (6)
So if FOSD holds, then the conclusion of higher admission standards for g-types remains robust to
risk-aversion considerations.
3 Data and Key Variables
In this study, we utilize anonymized administrative micro-data from the Cambridge Admissions
Offi ce, containing pre-entry qualifications and characteristics for 47804 applicants, including the
applicant’s sex and type of school but not the reference letters and student’s statement-of-purpose.
We also observe performance on past exams and subject-specific admissions/aptitude tests, if any.
We do not observe any indicator of interview performance obtained at admission-assessments.
Among those who eventually enter, we also observe their Tripos percentage score in each available
year of study. Specifically, our dataset consists of students who applied to study Economics,
Engineering, Mathematics, Natural Sciences, Law, or Medicine between 2013 —2017. Out of those,
8877 were accepted. The final first-year sample, for whom we have both pre-entry information and
post-entry exam scores, contains 8354 observations.
At the end of each year, students in each subject take standardized exams in multiple papers
which are blindly marked; the only identifying information an examiner observes is the candidate’s
centrally assigned 5-digit registration number on the script. For years 1, 2, and 3, we observe
aggregate scores expressed as percentages of the total. In the first year, most papers are compulsory,
while optional papers are more common in later years of study. For the regression analysis below,
we standardize these variables (i.e. subtract mean, divide by standard deviation) by subject.
For the school-type part of the analysis, three school categories are considered. Maintained
schools are state schools funded by the government, and therefore free of charge. Independent
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schools are private schools that charge fees, and typically enrol children from higher socioeconomic
status households. The category Other and overseas is used for schools outside the UK.
3.1 Summary Statistics
The detailed summary statistics are reported in Appendix Table A.2. The first-year sample consists
of 63.91% of males. The majority of students were from the UK (71.83%), of which 46% and 32%
came from maintained and independent schools, respectively. Nearly 20% of the first year sample
was admitted from the pool. The sample-sizes are roughly equal across five years.
The admission success-rates and first year raw average scores by subject are displayed in Appen-
dix Table A.1. The overall success rates were nearly equal between males and females (18.89% vs
18.04% resp.), with some heterogeneity across subjects. Males outperformed females on average in
the first-year exams in all subjects. The largest differences were in Mathematics and Engineering,
where females scored 5 and 7 percentage points lower than males on average, respectively. In terms
of school-type, students from independent schools had a higher success rate (28.7% vs 20.65%)
overall relative to those from maintained schools. In respect of the first year average exam score,
independent school admits slightly outperformed their maintained school counterparts but were
outperformed by admits from overseas schools.
4 Gender Results
We first apply the methods outlined in Section 2.1 to the above datasets with the groups g and h
denoting males and females, respectively. In Figure 1, Panel A, we plot the cumulative distribution
function of first year Tripos percentage scores for four subgroups of admitted students, viz. pooled
male, non-pooled male, pooled female and non-pooled female, broken up by ESTEM (STEM plus
Economics) versus non-ESTEM, i.e. Medicine and Law. In ESTEM, we see clear evidence that
the non-pooled, i.e. directly admitted males distribution first-order stochastically dominate the
rest, followed by pooled males, non-pooled females and, finally pooled females. The fact that
pooled males have stochastically higher Tripos-scores than non-pooled i.e. directly admitted female
entrants throughout the distribution suggests a higher admission bar for males, c.f. equations (4)
and (6) above. In contrast, pooled females are dominated by both the pooled and the non-pooled
males. On the other hand, in the non-ESTEM subjects, the performance distribution of pooled
males and non-pooled females can be seen to be very similar. The same pattern is also observed
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within each subject comprising ESTEM and non-ESTEM, these subject-specific graphs are reported
in the Appendix Fig A.1.
The graphical evidence above is then corroborated by regression analysis on the combined
sample of pooled male and non-pooled female entrants to check whether the observed gender gaps
are statistically significant. We do this in Table 1, Panel A, Column (1), where we regress Tripos
percentage (standardized across subjects) on a dummy indicating pooled males. The positive,
statistically highly significant coeffi cient 0.139 on the dummy variable implies that compared to
non-pooled female applicants, the pooled males score an average of 0.14 standard deviations higher,
which represents the lower bound on g1 − h1 (c.f. (4)), the male-female difference in admission-
thresholds.
There are three key challenges in interpreting this estimate as an indication of lower admission
standards for females. Firstly, males could apply to subjects that are more selective in the first
round of admissions than females. Secondly, the effect could be driven by college specific charac-
teristics, if for example, pooled males were typically admitted to a different set of colleges than
non-pooled females. Thirdly, the effect could stem from decentralized admissions if males applied
disproportionately to colleges that happen to be more selective in the first round of admissions. We
alleviate these concerns by including fixed effects for subject, offer college, and apply college. In
Column (4), the estimate shrinks to 0.101 with p-value less than 1%. Columns (5) and (6) confirm
the previous finding that these results are being driven entirely by ESTEM. Within ESTEM itself,
Economics and Mathematics had the largest gender-gap, while all the others were positive and with
p-values below 5%; for brevity, we do not report the subject-specific results here; Appendix Fig
A.1 reports the subject-specific graphs.
Persistence over Time: To understand the nature of the differences found in first year
results, we investigate whether the gap persists as the students progress through the years. As the
last examination period that we observe is Spring 2018, second- and third-year Tripos results are
available solely for the earlier cohorts of students. Therefore, we re-perform the above exercise using
these shorter samples and compare the results to the original sample used above; Table 1, Panel
B, shows that the first-year gap is very similar in the three samples for ESTEM subjects. The key
substantive finding from Panel B is that as the students progressed through the years, the first year
gender gap appears to fall. For example, when judged by third-year Tripos performance in ESTEM
subjects (Columns (3) and (4) in Table 1, Panel B) the gap appears to have shrunk considerably
(0.167 vs -0.049 standard deviations). This narrowing could either reflect better acclimatization of
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female students to exam conditions, or could be a result of effi cient sorting into optional papers
which are typically offered in later years. We also performed the same exercise for non-ESTEM
subjects and found that the estimates remain statistically insignificant in later years.
4.1 Possible Mechanisms
Pre-Admission Qualifications: We first investigate whether and to what extent can the observed
gender difference be attributable to specific pre-admission qualifications.
To do this, we first use the subsample of enrolled students (pooled males plus non-pooled
females) who have taken GCSE or IGCSE, a common, compulsory board exam taken at the age of
16 in the UK. For each exam, a pupil receives grades A∗, A, B,...,U, where A∗ is the highest and
U is the lowest. We use the number of A∗s as a measure of prior ability and redo our analysis.
Column (1) of Table 2 shows that in this subsample, the gap between pooled males and non-
pooled females based on their first-year performance in the Cambridge Tripos remains statistically
significant, as in the entire sample. However, in respect of the pre-entry A∗ count, Column (2)
shows that the non-pooled females in fact dominate pooled males.
Next, we consider the Sixth Term Examination Papers in Mathematics (STEP) test. After
receiving a conditional acceptance in Maths, a student is typically required to take parts 2 and 3 of
this test, and eventual admission depends on that performance. The STEP 2 and STEP 3 scores
of non-pooled females are statistically indistinguishable from pooled males (c.f. Columns (3) —(5)
in Table 2).
The above evidence suggest that our observed gender gaps cannot be attributable to pre-
admission qualification and preparation to the extent revealed by standardized tests. They also
suggest that differential impact of post-admission teaching methods and/or any implicit bias in
(blind) internal assessment may play a role in producing the observed gender-gap. In other words,
our measure of merit, i.e. the Tripos score, is to be interpreted as inclusive of the post-entry
academic experience of admitted individuals, as in any outcome-based test of fair decisions.
Peer Effects: The gap between pooled males and non-pooled females could be driven by peer
effects. In our sample, only 36.09% of students are females. It is conceivable that females were
affected negatively by environments with fewer female classmates. To test this, we investigate
whether the gap in first-year performance was lower in subject-year-college combinations with a
higher share of females. We do not find any evidence supporting this hypothesis (c.f. Column (6)
in Table 2).
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The Effect of Being Pooled: One alternative explanation of our finding is that the knowledge
of being pooled prompted the pooled male students to exert more effort relative to students who
were directly admitted.5 We investigate this through a difference-in-differences strategy, using a
reform introduced in 2015. Effectively, before 2015 and not after, pooled admits who were eventually
admitted by the college they applied to knew that they had been pooled, and these serve as the
treatment group. Pooled males who were admitted by a different college than the one they had
applied to serve as our control group, since this group knew that they had been pooled both before
and after the reform. The statistically insignificant estimate of Same college × Year = 2013 in
Column (7) of Table 2 shows that the parallel trend assumption holds for the pre-reform period.
Column (8) shows that the knowledge of being pooled does not affect the performance of pooled
males in first year exams. Therefore, it is unlikely that our findings are driven by the effect of being
pooled.
Three other robustness checks include:
(i) Women-Only Colleges: Cambridge has three colleges that admit only women; these
colleges were established later than most others, and therefore have had slightly different history
and trajectories. Our gender results remain robust to including college fixed effects, and separately,
dropping the women-only colleges from the sample.
(ii) Other Background Controls: Another possible concern is false attribution, e.g. the
gender-gap stems from school-type if non-pooled females come mainly from state schools whereas
pooled males come mainly from private schools. To check this, we included dummies for school-type
(independent, maintained, and other and overseas) and domicile category (EU excluding the UK,
the UK, and other and overseas) as additional controls.
(iii) Year Effects: We included fixed effects for apply year and exam year to ensure that the
scores are comparable across years.
Table 3 shows that the performance-gap between pooled males and non-pooled females is robust
to all three issues discussed above.
Alternative Identification Strategy: Lastly, we consider a small subset of pooled students
who were not picked by other colleges, and eventually admitted by the same college that had
placed them into the pool. These students may be viewed, albeit somewhat crudely6, as ‘marginal’
admits in the sense that they were considered weaker than the direct admits in the first round
5We are grateful to Julia Shvets for discussions on this point.
6A negligibly small number are pooled while the deciding college is waiting for additional information on them.
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by the pooling college and also not picked by other colleges from the pool, but did eventually get
admitted. Column (5) of Table 3 shows that, conditional on subject and offer college fixed effects,
the males in this subgroup scored 0.142 standard deviations higher in first-year exams than females
in this subgroup. This result lends further support to our finding that, judging by the first year
Tripos performance, the admission threshold for females is lower than that for males. The number
of such students is small (342), hence we did not break this up by subjects; but since the overall
difference is large, we conjecture that it would be higher still if we considered ESTEM students
alone.
5 School-Type Results
The political debate around Oxbridge admissions is primarily centred on school-type rather than
gender, i.e. whether the admission process enhances social diversity and mobility by admitting
suffi ciently many students from maintained, i.e. state-funded and free schools. To investigate this
issue from the perspective of meritocracy, we apply the methods of Section 2.1 using as group g the
candidates from independent and overseas schools; the two groups are combined because both of
them attract candidates from relatively more affl uent backgrounds. We use the label Other schools
for this combined group. This group is then compared with group h consisting of candidates from
maintained UK schools.
Plotting the CDFs of first year Tripos scores for pooled and non-pooled subgroups within these
two categories (Figure 1, Panel B) shows that the non-pooled dominate the pooled, within and
across school-types. A t-test for equality of the means between pooled others and non-pooled (i.e.
directly admitted) maintained yields a p-value of 0.7 with the estimated mean being slightly higher
for the former. This implies the inequality g1 − h1 > 0 (see discussion following equation (5)).
Column (3) in Table 4 shows that the mean-difference increases to 0.118 with a small p-value once
fixed effects for subject and offer college are included. However, it becomes insignificant once we
include fixed effects for apply college c.f. Column (4). Further, Columns (5) —(8) show that the
gap remains statistically insignificant in later years.
The above findings suggest that while there is some suggestive evidence of lower admission-




Analyzing merit versus diversity balance in university admissions is diffi cult due to applicant char-
acteristics observed by admission-offi cers but unobservable to analysts, leading to the well-known
infra-marginality problem. We address this problem in the context of undergraduate admissions at
Cambridge University, using 5 years’(2013-17) administrative micro-data on applicants, matched
with blindly marked, end-of-year exam scores for the admitted students, which we take as our
measure of merit. To overcome the infra-marginality issue, we utilize the two-staged feature of
Cambridge admissions, involving students who were directly admitted in a first round vis-a-vis
those not directly admitted in the first round but admitted in a second round clearing mechanism
called the ‘pool’. If students of (demographic) type g admitted from the pool performed better
in post-entry exams than h-types directly admitted in the first round, then we can conclude that
entry-bar for direct admissions was higher for g-types, irrespective of the unobservability problem.
Applying this idea to our data, we find strong evidence that in STEM fields and economics, male
applicants faced a higher admission threshold. This finding is resilient to a variety of robustness
checks, and are suggestive of a genuine underlying regularity. We find no evidence to suggest that
pre-admission standardized test scores are any worse for female applicants, or that the relative
scarcity of female students has a detrimental effect on performance, e.g. via lower morale and
confidence. The gender-gap becomes less apparent as students advanced through the years, and is
not detected in any year of study in the non-STEM but highly competitive subjects of Law and
Medicine.
The evidence for school-type is less conclusive; there is at most weak evidence that the admission
bar was lower for applicants from maintained (i.e. state-funded and free) schools, who on average
are economically less privileged than those attending fee-charging private schools.
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Figure 1: First-year Tripos percentage scores by pool status and gender and school type.
Note. The graph shows the cumulative distribution function of first-year Tripos percentage scores for different subgroups of
students. In Panel A, the functions are plotted separately for ESTEM and non-ESTEM subjects, whereas in Panel B the two
sets of subjects are combined.
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Table 1: The gap between pooled males and non-pooled females.
Panel A. First year
All subjects ESTEM Non-ESTEM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled male 0.139 0.185 0.251 0.101 0.169 -0.088
(0.049) (0.056) (0.045) (0.051) (0.061) (0.095)
Observations 3245 3245 3245 3245 2214 1031
Subject FE X X X X X
Offer college FE X X X X
Apply college FE X X X
Panel B. Later years: ESTEM
Second-year sample Third-year sample
Year 1 Year 2 Year 1 Year 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled male 0.154 0.081 0.167 -0.049
(0.067) (0.069) (0.077) (0.095)
Observations 1641 1641 1154 1154
Subject FE X X X X
Offer college FE X X X X
Apply college FE X X X X
Note. Each column reports the results from a different OLS regression. Pooled male: a dummy
variable that equals one for pooled males and zero for non-pooled females. Standard errors clustered
at the offer college level (Columns (1) and (2) in Panel A) and robust standard errors (the rest of
the columns in Panel A and all columns in Panel B) are reported in parentheses. Panel A. Sample:
pooled males and non-pooled females for whom first-year Tripos scores are available. Dependent
variable: the standardized score obtained in first-year Tripos exams. The sets of subjects used to
obtain the corresponding results are indicated in the column header. Panel B. First-, second-, and
third-year samples consist of students in ESTEM subjects for whom first-, second-, and third-year
Tripos scores are available, respectively. Dependent variable: indicated in the column header, where
Year 1, 2, and 3 stand for standardized scores obtained in first-, second-, and third-year Tripos
exams, respectively.
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Table 2: Gender gap: mechanisms.
A∗ count STEP Peer effects Being pooled
Year 1 A∗ count Year 1 STEP 2 STEP 3 Year 1 Year 1 Year 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pooled male 0.118 -0.372 0.331 -0.024 0.033 0.105
(0.066) (0.053) (0.183) (0.117) (0.117) (0.113)
Share female -0.025
(0.215)
Pooled male × Share female 0.243
(0.310)
Same college -0.341 -0.276
(0.217) (0.114)
Same college × Year=2013 0.126
(0.274)
Same college × Year=2015 0.090
(0.224)
Same college × Year=2016 -0.072
(0.272)
Same college × Year=2017 0.175
(0.288)
Same college × Post-reform 0.001
(0.124)
Observations 1661 1661 296 296 296 2214 992 992
Subject FE X X X
Offer college FE X X X
Apply college FE X X X X X X
Apply year FE X X
Note. Each column reports the results from a different OLS regression. The multicolumn headers represent potential mecha-
nisms. Sample for A∗ count : pooled males and non-pooled females in ESTEM subjects for whom the number of A∗s obtained
in the (I)GCSE exam is available. Sample for STEP : pooled males and non-pooled females who applied to Mathematics and
for whom STEP 2 and STEP 3 scores are available. Sample for Peer effects: pooled males and non-pooled females in ESTEM
subjects for whom first-year Tripos scores are available. Sample for Being pooled : pooled males for whom first-year Tripos
scores are available. Dependent variable: indicated in the column header, where Year 1, A∗ count, and STEP 2 and 3 stand
for the standardized score obtained in first-year Tripos exams, the standardized A∗ count obtained in (I)GCSE exams, and the
standardized STEP 2 and 3 scores. Pooled male: a dummy variable that equals one for pooled males and zero for non-pooled
females. Share female: for each student, we calculate the share of females in his/her subject-year-college combination (including
that student). Same college: a dummy variable that equals one for pooled males admitted by the college they applied to and
zero for pooled males admitted by another college. Year: application year. Post-reform: a dummy variable that equals one for
the years 2015, 2016, and 2017; and zero for the years 2013 and 2014. Robust standard errors (Columns (1) – (6)) and standard
errors clustered at the offer college level (Columns (7) and (8)) are reported in parentheses.
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Table 3: Gender gap: robustness checks.
Main Year FE Mixed Controls Marginal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled male 0.169 0.170 0.173 0.178
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Marginal male 0.142
(0.105)
Observations 2214 2214 2093 2214 342
Subject FE X X X X X
Offer college FE X X X X X
Apply college FE X X X X
Note. Each column reports the results from a different OLS regression. Sample: in
Columns (1) – (4), the initial sample consists of pooled males and non-pooled females
in ESTEM subjects for whom first-year Tripos scores are available. In Column (5),
the sample consists of students in all subjects taken back from the pool by the college
they applied to. Dependent variable: the standardized score obtained in first-year
Tripos exams. Pooled male: a dummy variable that equals one for pooled males and
zero for non-pooled females. Marginal male: a dummy variable that equals one for
marginal males and zero for marginal females. Main: main specification. Year FE:
with fixed effects for apply year and exam year. Mixed: only mixed gender colleges.
Controls: additional controls for school-type (independent, maintained, and other and
overseas) and domicile category (EU excluding the UK, UK, other and overseas).
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 4: The gap between non-pooled students from maintained schools and pooled students from other
schools.
First-year sample Second-year sample Third-year sample
Year 1 Year 1 Year 1 Year 1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 1 Year 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pooled others 0.014 0.010 0.118 0.033 -0.033 -0.071 -0.065 -0.092
(0.046) (0.047) (0.065) (0.054) (0.062) (0.064) (0.078) (0.087)
Observations 3982 3982 3982 3982 3013 3013 2136 2136
Subject FE X X X X X X X
Offer college FE X X X X X X
Apply college FE X X X X X
Note. Each column reports the results from a different OLS regression. First-, second-, and third-year samples consist
of students for whom first-, second-, and third-year Tripos scores are available, respectively. Sample: non-pooled
students from maintained schools and pooled students from other schools. Dependent variable: indicated in the column
header, where Year 1, 2, and 3 stand for standardized scores obtained in first-, second-, and third-year Tripos exams,
respectively. Pooled others: a dummy variable that equals one for pooled candidates from other schools and zero for
non-pooled candidates from maintained schools. Standard errors clustered at the offer college level (Columns (1) – (2))
and robust standard errors (Columns (3) – (8)) are reported in parentheses.
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Appendix A Additional Tables and Figures
Table A.1: Admission success-rates and first-year outcomes.
Variable
Gender School-type
Female Male Independent Maintained Other & overseas
Sucess-rate
All subjects 18.04 18.89 28.71 20.65 11.12
Economics 13.78 14.06 20.19 18.15 7.67
Engineering 18.36 14.30 22.91 16.97 9.82
Law 19.99 20.84 31.34 23.02 15.53
Mathematics 12.21 20.29 33.75 14.97 16.59
Medicine 16.06 22.13 31.32 26.59 4.81
Natural Sciences 21.41 22.87 33.33 23.73 13.23
First-year score
All subjects 62.26 65.63 64.42 63.36 66.64
Economics 62.60 65.70 64.56 64.45 65.18
Engineering 62.99 68.23 66.17 65.59 69.91
Law 62.80 63.79 63.07 63.15 63.39
Mathematics 59.36 66.34 64.37 62.96 70.18
Medicine 63.24 64.40 64.15 63.29 66.27
Natural Sciences 61.70 64.50 64.01 62.44 64.81
Note. Success-rate: Percent accepted out of initial applications. First-year score: Raw percentage of
total. The table provides success-rates and mean first-year Tripos percentage scores for all six subjects
bunched together and for each of them separately.
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Note. Based on the first-year sample. Pooled: admitted from the pool. The graph shows the cumulative distribution function
of first-year Tripos percentage scores for four subgroups of students – pooled females, non-pooled females, pooled males, and
non-pooled males – by subject.
Figure A.1: First-year Tripos percentage scores by gender, pool status, and subject.
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